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Abstract
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be
applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity
are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equi-
librium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on
peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination
games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of
ambiguity in games with strategic complements.
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1 Introduction
The growing literature on ambiguity in strategic games lacks two important features: First, an
elementary framework of ambiguity in games that can be easily understood and applied also
by non-specialists, and second, the treatment of an optimistic attitude towards ambiguity in
addition to ambiguity aversion or pessimism. In this article we take up both issues.
Ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty refers to a situation where probabilities are unknown
or imperfectly know as opposed to a situation under risk where probabilities are known. This
distinction has been made by Knight (1921). In fact for many economic or political situations
under uncertainty, it is not obvious at all why decision makers should know probabilities. For
instance, threats from terrorism and rogue states, and the likely impact of new technologies, etc.
Nevertheless, for several decades, subjective expected utility (henceforth SEU) by Savage (1954)
appeared to have rendered the distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty obsolete.
In this theory, individuals faced with uncertainty behave as if they hold beliefs that can be
represented by a subjective probability distribution. Hence, from an analytical point of view,
there was little distinction between risk and ambiguity.
However early evidence by Ellsberg (1961) suggests that beliefs cannot be represented by
conventional probabilities. Systematic laboratory experiments have confirmed Ellsberg’s con-
jecture, see Camerer and Weber (1992). Despite the experimental evidence, SEU proved to be
a successful modelling tool. Important insights were obtained from the distinction between risk
preferences and beliefs, which can be made in this approach. The economics of insurance and
information could be developed in this context. It is desirable to develop a theory of ambiguity,
which is equally suitable for application. The inconsistencies between Savages’s theory and em-
pirically observed behaviour have stimulated efforts for alternative theories. One of the most
promising of these is Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU), which involves representing
individuals’ beliefs by non-additive probabilities (or capacities, i.e., probabilities that do not
necessarily add up to one), see Schmeidler (1989). In this theory, individuals maximise the
expected value of a utility function with respect to a non-additive belief, and the expectation
is expressed as a Choquet integral, Choquet (1953-4). CEU is a generalization of subjective
expected utility. It has the advantage that it maintains the separation of beliefs and outcome
evaluation, which makes the theory easier to apply in economics and social sciences.
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A key element of Knight’s work was that people differ in their attitudes to ambiguity. The
majority of people tend to avoid ambiguous situations. However a minority of individuals
actually appear to seek ambiguity. Experimental evidence shows a similar pattern. A majority
of experimental subjects behave more cautiously when probabilities are undefined, while a
significant minority displays the opposite attitude, (see for instance Camerer andWeber (1992)).
Moreover the same individual may be pessimistic (or ambiguity averse) in one situation and
optimistic (or ambiguity seeking) in another. The evidence shows that those ambiguity attitudes
are distinct from risk attitudes, see Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1985). Individuals may be risk-
averse and ambiguity-loving and vice-versa.
Most of the work on Choquet expected utility theory has been focused on arbitrary convex
capacities, i.e., capacities that allow for a pessimistic attitude to ambiguity only. Consequently,
the generality of arbitrary convex capacities made expositions relatively inaccessible to the non-
specialist and the focus on the pessimistic attitude limited the scope of potential applications.
Recently, Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2002) axiomatised Choquet expected utility
theory, where preferences are represented as a weighted average of the expected utility, the
maximum utility and the minimum utility. While a special case, this representation has the
advantage of being simple to apply and easy to interpret. Moreover, it allows for a meaningful
notion of both optimism as well as pessimism as weight put on the best and worst outcomes
respectively. We take this model further and apply it to strategic games.
In strategic games we model interaction among players who face ambiguity about the op-
ponent’s strategy. A player may react optimistically (resp. pessimistic) towards this ambiguity
by over-weighting strategies of the opponent which are good (resp. bad) to the player. We
introduce the concept of Equilibrium under Ambiguity, prove existence and relate it to Nash
equilibrium without ambiguity. An Equilibrium under Ambiguity is an equilibrium when beliefs
are represented by capacities.
We demonstrate the simple applicability of our framework and present some comparative
static results on the impact of ambiguity. Specifically we consider the impact of optimism and
pessimism in some familiar models from industrial organisation. In a Cournot oligopoly with
linear demand and constant marginal cost, the worst (resp. best) outcome would be perceived
as a rival producing a large (resp. low) quantity. Under these assumptions, Cournot oligopoly
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is a game of strategic substitutes and negative externalities. Optimism (resp. pessimism) has
the effect of increasing (resp. reducing) the perceived marginal benefit of producing more and
so increases (resp. reduces) the equilibrium output. This decreases (resp. raises) profits but
increases (resp. reduces) consumer surplus. In contrast, in Bertrand competition, a good (resp.
bad) outcome would be perceived as rival firms charging a high (resp. low) price. Typically
there is strategic complementarity in Bertrand models. In this case, optimism (resp. pessimism)
will increase (resp. reduce) the incentive for any given firm to increase its price and hence will
also increase (resp. reduce) the equilibrium price.
Traditionally, it has been suspected that oligopolies are prone to informal collusive arrange-
ments. Scherer (1970) provides many examples from anti-trust cases. The presumption of reg-
ulators that oligopolists collude, suggests that output is, at least sometimes, below the Cournot
level without clear evidence of collusion. Ambiguity-aversion may offer an alternative and as
yet unexplored explanation for why competition may be less fierce in Cournot-style oligopoly
than predicted by Nash equilibrium.
In Cournot and Bertrand models, there is scope for strategic delegation. Interestingly, in
both Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly we show that it is desirable for the owner of a firm to
delegate decision-making to a manager who is more optimistic than (s)he is. This result is rather
striking since usually comparative results are reversed in one setting versus the other. Already
Knight (1921) argued in his theory of profit and entrepreneurial activity, that entrepreneurs tend
to be individuals who are less ambiguity-averse. Indeed, there is evidence from interviews with
new entrepreneurs that their self-assessed chances of success are uncorrelated with objective
predictors like education, prior experience, and initial capital, and are in average widely off
the mark (Cooper, Dunkelberg, and Woo (1988)). In a different study, new life insurance
agents who were optimistic sold more policies during their first year and were less likely to quit
(Seligman and Schulman (1986)).
Ambiguity is not confined to economic situations. For instance, environmental risks are of-
ten ambiguous due to limited knowledge of the relevant science and because outcomes will only
be seen many decades from now. The effects of global warming and the environmental impact
of genetically modified crops are two examples. Other fields characterized by ambiguity are
politics, diplomacy and international security as many recent events in world politics dramat-
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ically demonstrate. To illustrate the potential of our framework we consider a stylized model
of peace-making in section 5. Because of the singularity of each conflict, it is hard for involved
parties for come up with exact probability judgements. Thus ambiguity plays a large role in
conflict resolution such as in the Middle East peace-making (see for example Klieman (1999))1
or the conflict in Northern Ireland. This is confirmed by statements of key players involved
in peace-making, such as Garret Fitzgerald, former Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, who
said that “(f)rom the start to finish a striking feature of the whole prolonged Peace Process has
been the prevalence of ambiguity in every aspect what has been done. Ambiguity about the rela-
tionship between the IRA and Sinn Fein, ambiguity about the commitment to decommissioning;
ambiguity about the meaning of the ceasefire; ambiguity between successive Irish governments
and Sinn Fein. The last truth is that without all this literally demoralising ambiguity we would
not have come to the point where 35 years of continuous violence in the North and 80 years
of sporadic violence in our own State that has cost the lives of politicians and many members
of the security forces is about to end.” (Irish Times, 12th April 2003). The role of ambiguity
in peace-making is largely circumstantial. Ambiguity leaves room for the optimistic hope that
peace indeed will be accomplished but pessimistic participants may also respond to ambigu-
ity with distrust in the opponent. We find that in our model these ambiguity-attitudes can
determine the success or failure of a peace process.
Beside above mentioned applications, we provide several new general results. For 2-player
games with real-valued strategy space, we show that if ambiguity is sufficiently large, then
equilibrium under ambiguity is unique. If in addition the game has strategic complements
we provide new results on the comparative statics of equilibria with respect to optimism and
pessimism. For such games with multiple equilibria we show results on equilibrium selection
due to sufficiently large degrees of optimism or pessimism.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how to model ambiguity in strate-
gic games. Then in section 3 we discuss a solution concept for games, which allows for the
possibility that the behaviour of other players may be perceived to be ambiguous. We show ex-
istence and the relationship with Nash equilibrium. In section 4 we demonstrate with oligopoly
1For example Kissinger remarked about the US brokered August 1970 cease-fire along the Suez Canal “Born
in fateful ambiguity”, see Klieman (1999). More recently, the Los Angeles Times (May 28, 2003) carried an
article “Road Map Torn by Ambiguity” by Max Abrahms from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
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models the simple applicability of our framework to economics. Non-economic applications
are demonstrated by the model of peace-making in section 5. Some general results concern-
ing the comparative statics of ambiguity are presented in section 6 and section 7 contains our
conclusions. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
2 Modelling Ambiguity in Strategic Games
In this section we explain how ambiguity can be modelled in strategic games by non-additive
beliefs. We present the concepts of a neo-additive capacity (a class of non-additive beliefs) and
of the Choquet integral.
2.1 Games
Unless otherwise mentioned, we consider for simplicity a strategic game G = 〈(Si, ui)i=1,2〉 with
two players i = 1, 2, where each player’s strategy set Si ⊆ R is a closed and bounded real-valued
interval. Economic examples often deal with quantities and prices. Hence, for most purposes,
it is sufficient to assume that each agent chooses real-valued variables. The pay-off function
of player i denoted by ui(si, s−i) is assumed to be quasi-concave in his/her strategy and twice
continuously differentiable in strategies of both players. The following notational conventions
will be maintained throughout this paper. The set of strategy combinations will be denoted
by S = S1 × S2. A typical strategy combination s ∈ S can be decomposed into the strategy
si of player i and the strategy of the opposing player s−i, s = (si, s−i). The set of strategy
combinations of player i’s opponent is denoted by S−i.
2.2 Non-Additive Beliefs and Expectations
Consider an economic agent whose profit may depend in part on the actions of rivals. Here,
ambiguity concerns the possible play of one’s opponent. We shall represent individuals’ beliefs
by capacities. A capacity plays a similar role to a subjective probability in SEU. In this paper
we shall confine attention to neo-additive capacities2, defined below.
2Neo is an abbreviation for N
¯
on-e
¯
xtremal o
¯
utcome additive. CEU with neo-additive capacities is axiomatised
in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2002).
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Definition 2.1 (Neo-additive Capacity) Let γ, λ be real numbers such that 0 6 γ 6 1,
0 6 λ 6 1 − γ, and let pi be a probability distribution on S−i, define a neo-additive capacity ν
by ν (A) = λ+ (1− λ− γ)pi (A), ∅ $ A $ S−i; ν (∅) = 0, ν (S−i) = 1.
Let u be a utility function which represents the decision-makers’ pay-offs as a function of
the acts of his/her opponent. The expectation of u with respect to the neo-additive capacity
ν, is given by the Choquet integral (see Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2002)).3
Definition 2.2 (Choquet Integral) The Choquet expected value of the utility ui with respect
to the neo-additive capacity ν = λ+ (1− λ− γ)pi from playing si ∈ Si is given by:∫
ui (si, s−i) dν = λMi (si) + γmi (si) + (1− γ − λ)Epiui (si, s−i) , (1)
where Epiui (si, ·) denotes the expected utility of ui with respect to the probability distribution pi
on S−i, Mi (si) = maxs−i∈S−i ui (si, s−i), and mi (si) = mins−i∈S−i ui (si, s−i).
Beliefs modelled by neo-additive capacities have several advantages. First, they are easy
to interpret. Intuitively a neo-additive capacity describes a situation in which the individual
believes that the likelihood of events is described by the additive probability measure pi. However
(s)he lacks confidence in this belief. In part (s)he reacts to this in an optimistic way by over-
weigthing the best outcome M as measured by λ and in part the reaction is pessimistic by
over-weighting the worst outcome m, measured by γ. The amount of perceived ambiguity may
be measured by the sum γ + λ.
Second, CEU with neo-additive capacities is easy to relate to some familiar decision rules:
1. If λ = 0 and γ = 1, preferences have the maximin form and are extremely pessimistic;
2. if λ = 1 and γ = 0, preferences exhibit the maximal degree of optimism;
3. if λ+ γ = 1, these preferences coincide with the Hurwicz criterion, (see Hurwicz (1951));
3Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axiomatisations for general CEU
preferences. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), Wakker (2001) and Epstein (1999) characterise capacities repre-
senting ambiguity-averse or pessimistic attitudes of a decision maker. There is also a closely related literature
which represents beliefs as sets of conventional probability distributions, see Bewley (2002), Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989), Kelsey (1994).
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4. if λ = γ = 0, beliefs coincide with conventional expectations. In particular the capacity is
additive, which implies that for all events A,B ⊆ S−i, A∩B = ∅, ν(A∪B) = ν(A)+ν(B),
i.e., the capacity is a conventional probability distribution.
Third, neo-additive capacities reduce the technical complexity of the CEU model. The neo-
additive capacity is represented by a convex combination. The Choquet integral is similar to a
conventional expectation since it is a weighted average. In particular, it is a weighted average of
the minimum, the maximum and some mean pay-off. More important, neo-additive capacities
are less mathematically complex than more general classes of capacities, i.e., capacities that
satisfy just monotonicity, A ⊆ B, A,B ⊆ S−i, ⇒ ν(A) ≤ ν(B), and normalization, ν(∅) = 0
and ν(S−i) = 1. One of the reasons why CEU with general capacities (see Schmeidler, 1989)
is often hard to apply is because capacities may involve many parameters. While only n − 1
parameters will describe a probability distribution on a set with n elements, a general capacity
on the same set involves 2n parameters. In contrast, a neo-additive capacity can be described
by just n+ 1 parameters.
Fourth, there is experimental evidence that preferences have the form of a weighted average
of the minimum, the maximum and some mean pay-offs, see Lopes (1987).4
Finally, CEU with neo-additive capacities allows us to define a meaningful notion of opti-
mism and pessimism (attitude towards ambiguity), as well as lack of confidence in the belief
(ambiguity).
Definition 2.3 (Optimism/Pessimism) Let ν = λ+ (1− λ− γ)pi be a neo-additive capac-
ity. We define the degree of optimism (resp. pessimism) of ν by λ (ν) = λ, (resp. γ (ν) = γ).
One can interpret the additive part of a neo-additive capacity pi as the decision-maker’s belief
and (1− λ− γ) as the degree of confidence in that belief. In the light of equation (1), we refer
to the parameter λ (resp. γ) as degree of optimism (resp. pessimism). If beliefs are represented
by conventional probabilities, it is not possible to model decision-makers who lack confidence
in their beliefs. The ability to make this distinction offers opportunities to analyse the impact
of ambiguity and optimism/pessimism in economic models. With neo-additive capacities it is
relatively easy to study the comparative statics with respect to ambiguity-attitudes.
4Such preferences have been axiomatised in the context of risk by Cohen (1992).
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The Choquet integral is similar to a conventional expectation since it is a weighted average
of utilities and the weights sum to 1. However the weights are not probabilities but decision
weights. Neo-additive capacities allow us to model optimistic or pessimistic individuals accord-
ing to the decision weights which they apply to outcomes. The best (resp. worst) outcome,
M (resp. m) gets weight λ + (1− γ − λ)pi (M) (resp. γ + (1− γ − λ)pi (m)). For any other
outcome x the decision weight is (1− γ − λ)pi (x). The Choquet integral is simply the sum
over all outcomes of the act weighted by these decision weights.5
If λ = 0, then preferences may be represented in the form a < b ⇔ minpi∈C Epiu (a) >
minpi∈C Epiu (b), where C is a set of conventional additive probabilities. We believe this formula
is intuitive. When a decision-maker does not know the true probability (s)he considers a set of
probabilities to be possible. He/she behaves cautiously and evaluates any course of action by
the least favourable probability distribution. This small deviation from subjective probabilities
allows us to capture the certainty effect6, which is consistently observed in experimental work
(Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Kilka and Weber (1998)).
We shall assume that all individuals have CEU preferences and beliefs, which can be repre-
sented by a neo-additive capacity.
Finally, we need to define the support of a capacity.
Definition 2.4 (Support) The support of the neo-additive capacity ν (A) = λ+(1− λ− γ)pi (A),
is defined by supp ν = supp pi.
Note that contrary to probability distributions, for the support of a neo-additive capacity
we have ν (supp ν)+ν (S−i \ supp ν) = 1−γ+λ, which is not in general equal to 1. If beliefs are
represented by a neo-additive capacity then the best and worst outcomes will influence choice
in addition to members of the support.
5Sarin and Wakker (1998) provide a detailed discussion of the relationship between decision weights and
capacities.
6An individual displays the certainty effect if (s)he is willing to pay a large premium to avoid a small risk of
receiving nothing.
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3 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In this section we present an equilibrium concept for strategic games with ambiguity. Consider
player i who faces ambiguity about his/her opponent’s choice of strategy. If player i’s beliefs are
modelled by a neo-additive capacity νi on S−i, i.e., with an additive probability distribution pii
on S−i, a degree of optimism λi and a degree of pessimism γi, then the expected payoff function
is the Choquet integral,
Vi (si;pii, λi, γi) = λiMi (si) + γimi (si) + (1− λi − γi)
∫
ui(si, s−i)dpii(s−i). (2)
In games, one can determine pii endogenously as the prediction of the players from the
knowledge of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, we treat the
degrees of optimism, λi and pessimism, γi as exogenous.
Define the best-response correspondence of player i given that his/her beliefs are represented
by a neo-additive capacity νi by Ri(νi) = Ri(pii, λi, γi) := argmaxsi∈Si Vi(si;pii, λi, γi).
Definition 3.1 (Equilibrium under Ambiguity) A pair of neo-additive capacities (ν∗1 , ν∗2)
is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) if:
supp ν∗i j R−i(ν∗−i),
for i = 1, 2.
In equilibrium, each player assigns strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponent’s best
responses given the opponent’s belief. However, each player lacks confidence in his/her likeli-
hood assessment and responds in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome, or in
a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome. This notion of equilibrium is similar to
that suggested by Dow and Werlang (1994) for 2-player games which was extended to n-player
games by Eichberger and Kelsey (2000). It is more general, since we allow for optimistic as well
as pessimistic preferences. On the other hand Dow and Werlang (1994) and Eichberger and
Kelsey (2000) are also more general since they allow beliefs to be an arbitrary convex capacity.
Our notion of Equilibrium under Ambiguity has a close relation to the standard Nash
equilibrium. Indeed, for no ambiguity, λi = γi = 0 for all i = 1, 2, this solution concept would
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coincide with Nash equilibrium of the game G = 〈(Si, ui)i=1,2〉. Let pi∗ = (pi∗1, pi∗2) be a (possibly
mixed) Nash equilibrium, then pi∗i is player’s i additive belief over the opponent −i’s strategy
with the property that any action in the support of pi∗i is a best-response given pi
∗
−i. This is the
interpretation of Nash equilibrium as equilibrium in beliefs. Above we define an Equilibrium
under Ambiguity as an equilibrium in non-additive beliefs (ν∗1 , ν∗2). Equilibrium strategies are
given by the supports of the capacities, which are required to be best-responses. If these are
unique, we have a pure equilibrium. If there are several strategies, which a player considers as
equal best, then any combination of these is possible in equilibrium. For example in Matching
Pennies, any combination of “heads ” and “tails ” will represent equilibrium behaviour as long
as both players do not believe that the opponent would favour a particular choice. If there
is no ambiguity, then the equilibrium definition (3.1) specifies a pair of independent additive
probability distributions, which is a mixed strategies Nash equilibrium.
There is a second connection between the Equilibrium under Ambiguity and Nash equilib-
rium. Let λ = (λ1, λ2) and γ = (γ1, γ2), and consider the strategic game Γ(λ, γ) =
〈(Si, Vi(·; ·, λi, γi))i=1,2〉, i.e., the “perturbed” game derived from G = 〈(Si, ui)i=1,2〉 by replac-
ing ui with the Choquet expected payoff functions Vi(·; ·, λi, γi) for i = 1, 2. We claim that any
pure strategy Nash equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2) of the perturbed game Γ(λ, γ) is a pure strategy
Equilibrium under Ambiguity ν∗ = (ν∗1 , ν∗2) of the game G with degree of optimism λi and
degree of pessimism γi for i = 1, 2. Indeed, for each player i define a neo-additive capacity
ν∗i = λi + (1 − λi − γi)pi∗i that assigns probability pi∗i (s∗−i) = 1 to s∗−i. Since (s∗1, s∗2) is a Nash
equilibrium of Γ(λ, γ), we have supp(ν∗i ) = {s∗−i} ⊆ R−i(ν∗−i). Thus ν∗ is an Equilibrium under
Ambiguity. This proves the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 For any pure strategy Nash equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2) of Γ(λ, γ) =
〈(Si, Vi(·; ·, λi, γi))i=1,2〉, there is a pure strategy Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) ν∗ =
(ν∗1 , ν∗2) of G = 〈(Si, ui)i=1,2〉, in which player i has degrees of optimism λi and pessimism γi,
and pi∗i (s
∗
−i) = 1.
This observation leads immediately to an existence result. In economic applications, players’
strategy sets are mostly continuous variables, such as prices, quantities and investment expen-
ditures. In such situations, pure Nash equilibria exist.7 To extent this idea to strategic games
7We shall not consider mixed strategies in the present paper. Even for additive beliefs, the interpretation of
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with ambiguity, we just need to ensure that the best (resp. worst) outcome is “well-behaved”.
Definition 3.2 (Positive/Negative Externalities) The game G has positive (resp. nega-
tive) externalities if ui (si, s−i) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in s−i, for i = 1, 2.
If there are positive (resp. negative) externalities a good outcome will be interpreted as the
opponent playing a high (resp. low) strategy. Many games relevant to economics have such
a property. Proposition 3.2 shows that for such games EUA can be applied whenever Nash
equilibrium can.
Proposition 3.2 (Existence) If the game has positive or negative externalities, the strategy
sets Si ⊆ R are non-empty, compact and convex for all players i = 1, 2, and the payoff functions
ui(si, s−i) are continuous in s and concave in each player’s own strategy si for any s−i ∈ S−i,
then there exists an Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) in pure strategies.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, it suffices to show that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
game Γ(λ, γ) exists. By standard arguments, i.e., Glicksberg (1952), Γ(λ, γ) has a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium if for i = 1, 2, Si is a non-empty compact convex subset of an Euclidian space
and Vi is continuous in s and quasi-concave in si. We need to show that Vi is quasi-concave in
si, all other properties are straightforward.
Since G has positive (resp. negative) externalities, ui is continuous in s and S−i ⊆ R is
nonempty and compact, we have for any s′′i ∈ Si that argmaxs−i∈S−i ui(s′′i , s−i) 3 maxS−i
(resp. minS−i) and argmins−i∈S−i ui(s′′i , s−i) 3 minS−i (resp. maxS−i). Together with ui
being concave in si for each s−i ∈ S−i, it follows that Mi and mi are concave in si. Finally,
note that for any λi, γi with 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1− γi, Vi is a positively weighted sum of
functions concave in si, which implies that Vi itself is concave in si. Thus Vi is quasi-concave
in si. 
We illustrate Equilibrium under Ambiguity by the following example.
mixed Nash equilibria is debatable, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). If beliefs are strictly non-additive, then
behaviour, whether in pure or mixed strategies, cannot coincide with the strategies played, since there are no
non-additive randomising devices.
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Example 1 There are two players, an incumbent monopolist, I, and an entrant, E. If the
entrant chooses not to enter, ne, (s)he will receive payoff 0 and the incumbent will receive
the monopoly profits M . If the entrant enters the market, e, the incumbent has the choice of
accommodating entry, a or fighting a price war, f . If the incumbent accommodates entry, both
firms receive the duopoly profit d. Fighting entry causes both firms to sustain losses −L. The
interaction between the incumbent and the entrant may be represented as the following normal
form game:
Incumbent
Entrant
a f
e d, d −L,−L
ne 0,M 0,M
where M > d > 0 and L > 0.
There are two Nash equilibria (without ambiguity), (a, e), and (f, ne). In the first, the
incumbent accommodates and the entrant enters, while in the second the incumbent fights and
the entrant stays out. Based on standard equilibrium refinements such as subgame perfection
in an appropriately defined extensive form game, it is common to regard the latter equilibrium
as less plausible. Once the entrant is in the industry, the incumbent will make lower profits by
fighting than by accommodating.
Now we shall consider how ambiguity affects this example. We shall assume that agents
are purely pessimistic, i.e. γ > 0, λ = 0. When there is ambiguity, we find a new type of
equilibrium. In this, the incumbent does not fight. However entry does not occur because the
entrant is pessimistic and perceives considerable ambiguity about the incumbent’s behaviour.
Consider the following beliefs: νE(a) = α, νE(f) = 0, L(d+L) > α > 0, ν
I(e) = 0, νI(ne) = β,
1 > β > 0. These beliefs show a high degree of pessimism for the entrant. With these beliefs
the (Choquet) expected payoff of the incumbent is given by:
V I (a) =Mβ + d (1− β) , V I (f) =Mβ − L (1− β) . (3)
Hence, a is a best response for the incumbent. If β < 1, then f is not a best response for the
incumbent. Since this holds for all β < 1, even small amounts of ambiguity-aversion are capable
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of eliminating non-credible threats.8 The (Choquet) expected utility of the entrant is given by,
V E (e) = dα− L (1− α) , V E (ne) = 0. (4)
Thus ne is a best response for the entrant if and only if,
α 6 L
(d+ L)
. (5)
We interpret this as saying the entrant will not enter if (s)he is sufficiently ambiguity-averse.
Equation (5) says that entry is more likely, the higher are the profits from successful entry d
and the lower are the losses from a price war, L. In Nash equilibrium, entry is independent
of these factors provided d and L are both positive. In our opinion, it is not implausible that
these factors would affect the outcome.
The case of large ambiguity-aversion shows how deviations from Nash equilibrium can arise
in EUA. The entrant considers it more likely that the incumbent will accommodate entry and
this belief is sustained in equilibrium. It is possible that such a decision might be affected by
ambiguity, since a firm will usually have much less information about an industry in which it
does not already have a presence. In practice, entry is likely to entail considerable expenditure
before any returns are received. By definition, the entrant is not already in the industry. Thus
(s)he may face some considerable ambiguity about relevant variables, in particular the behaviour
of the incumbent. It is not implausible that entrants might react by behaving cautiously and
not entering even if they do not expect the incumbent to fight a price war.
In standard Nash theory, the assumption that the incumbent will be more likely to play a,
implies that it is optimal to play e, which yields the higher payoff of d. This need not be the
case in an EUA, if the entrant is sufficiently ambiguity-averse. Clearly, the possibility that the
incumbent might fight entry, an event which is not in the support of the belief, influences the
equilibrium outcome. Such behaviour is not implausible when players perceive ambiguity. If
the entrant thinks that the incumbent will be cautious and accommodate, (s)he may still not
be bold enough, to enter, since a misjudgment will earn him/her an outcome of −L.
Our intuition suggests that (ne, a) is not an implausible way to behave. We suspect, however,
that the degree of ambiguity-aversion depends upon observations. As evidence builds up that
8This is true more generally see, Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Proposition 5.1.
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the opponent plays a (or f respectively), confidence may grow and choosing e (ne) may become
more likely. With a support notion, which insists that strategy combinations outside the support
do not affect behaviour, (ne, a) can never be an equilibrium. It seems to us an advantage of
EUA, that it opens the possibility to model such testable hypothesis.
4 Oligopoly Models
In this section, we shall present some examples of how the techniques described in previous
sections, can be used to examine the effect of ambiguity on economic behaviour. These ex-
amples will illustrate that the consequences of ambiguity can be examined without technical
sophistication.
4.1 Cournot Oligopoly
4.1.1 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
First we consider a symmetric Cournot duopoly, where firms produce homogenous products
and choose quantities as their strategic variable. We will show that, in this case, optimism
increases competition because it induces more aggressive behaviour. Pessimism will, in general,
have the opposite effect.
There are two firms, i = 1, 2, which compete in quantities. Assume that firm i faces the
linear inverse demand curve pi(xi, x−i) = max{1 − xi − x−i, 0}. We shall assume that each
firm can produce at constant marginal cost equal to c. Firm i chooses the quantity it wants to
supply, xi, from the interval [0, 1]. If beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities, a firm
over-weights the best and worst outcomes. We assume that firm i perceives the worst scenario
to be a situation, where its rival dumps a large quantity on the market, driving the price down
to zero. The firm’s perceived best outcome is assumed to be where the rival produces zero
output and the firm is a monopolist. Under these assumptions firm i’s (Choquet) expected
profit is:
Vi(xi, x−i) = λxi (1− xi) + (1− γi − λi)xi [1− x−i − xi]− cxi. (6)
A possible criticism of this model is that the choice of the best and the worst outcome is
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arbitrary. However our results remain true provided the best (resp. worst) outcome is below
(resp. above) the Nash equilibrium output.9
The first order condition for maximising firm 1’s profit is, dV1dx1 = λ1 (1− 2x1)+(1− γ1 − λ1)
(1− 2x1 − x2) = c. Hence the reaction function of firm 1 is given by,
R1 (x2) =
(1− γ1)− (1− γ1 − λ1)x2 − c
2 (1− γ1) . (7)
Proposition 4.1 In a symmetric equilibrium where λ1 = λ2 = λ and γ1 = γ2 = γ, the
equilibrium output and price are given by
x¯ =
1− γ − c
3− 3γ − λ, p¯ =
1− γ − λ+ 2c
3− 3γ − λ .
Proof. From equation (7), the equilibrium output x¯ is given by x¯ = (1−γ)−(1−γ−λ)x¯−c2(1−γ) , which
implies x¯ = 1−γ−c3−3γ−λ . The equilibrium price is given by p¯ =
1−γ−λ+2c
3−3γ−λ . 
The next result shows that if firms become more optimistic, (i.e., λ increases) then equilib-
rium output will rise. An increase in optimism will increase the weight the firm puts on rivals
producing a low output. This increases the marginal benefit of producing more and hence
results in an increase in equilibrium output.
Proposition 4.2 The effects of changes in ambiguity attitude on equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly
are as follows:
1. an increase in optimism increases output and decreases prices in equilibrium;
2. if λ < 3c, then an increase in pessimism reduces equilibrium output and increases prices.
Proof. By inspection, x¯ is an increasing function of λ. Since dpdx¯ = −2, the equilibrium price
is a decreasing function of λ. The effect of an increase in pessimism on output is given by,
dx¯
dγ =
λ−3c
(3−3γ−λ)2 , which is negative provided λ < 3c. As before,
dp
dγ = −2dx¯dγ . 
9See Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) Proposition 3.1, for a related result which does not depend on assumptions
about the perceived best and worst outcomes.
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Intuitively, more optimism causes a firm to place more weight on the possibility that its
rival will produce a low output. This increases the marginal profitability of extra output. Thus
the given firm will produce more. This reasoning is not restricted to the specific demand and
cost functions but will apply whenever Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes.
In general one would not expect the effect of optimism to be large, hence it seems reasonable
to assume λ < 3c, in which case an increase in pessimism would decrease equilibrium output.
Likewise an increase in pessimism causes firms to place more weight on the possibility that a
rival will produce a high output. This reduces the marginal benefit of producing more and
hence tends to decrease equilibrium strategies.10
Corollary 4.1 Assume x¯ > 14 (1− c), then:
1. an increase in optimism decreases equilibrium profits;
2. if λ < 3c, then an increase in pessimism increases equilibrium profits.
Proof. Symmetric equilibrium profits are given by, V = (p (x (λ))− c)x (λ), hence
∂V
∂λ = (p (x¯ (λ))− c) ∂x¯∂λ + dpdx¯ ∂x¯∂λ x¯ (λ) = ∂x¯∂λ
[
p (x¯ (λ))− c+ dpdx¯ x¯ (λ)
]
= ∂x¯∂λ [1− c− 4x¯ (λ)]. Thus
provided x¯ > 14 (1− c) an increase in λ decreases profit. The proof of part 2 follows by similar
reasoning. 
The condition x¯ > 14 (1− c) says that the effects of ambiguity are relatively small, in the
sense that they do not induce firms to produce less than the collusive output. We would view
this as the normal case.
To illustrate these results consider the case where there is no optimism λ = 0. By equation
(7) the symmetric equilibrium is characterised by
1
2
− 3
2
x¯ =
1
2 (1− γ)c. (8)
10However in this case there is an opposing effect. Assume cost is zero, by equation (6) the objective function
of firm i is cardinally equivalent to V˜i =
λ
1−γ xi (1− xi) + (1−γ−λ)1−γ xi [1− x−i − xi]. Increasing γ increases the
weight placed on the monopoly profits in this expression and hence increases the output. A similar effect applies
when cost is low but not zero i.e. 3c < λ.
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Assume that there is an increase in pessimism, γ rises. Then the rhs. of equation (8) increases.
Since the lhs. of equation (8) is decreasing in x¯ (γ), x¯ must be a decreasing function of γ.
An increase in pessimism will decrease the quantities in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium,
as depicted in Figure 1. As firms are symmetric, EUA are intersections of the best response
function with the 45-degree line.
Figure 1: Cournot equilibrium and ambiguity
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x(γ) 
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Pessimism reduces the amount brought to market. Intuitively, ambiguity makes a decision-
maker cautious about the behaviour of the opponent. By dumping output onto the market, the
rival can drive down the price. If firms become more concerned about this possibility, they will
reduce output in order to avoid the losses that would arise in such a case.
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4.1.2 Strategic Delegation
In this section we show that it may be profitable to delegate decision-making to a manager who
is more optimistic than the owner of the firm. This allows the owner to commit to producing
a larger output, which is advantageous in a game of strategic substitutes. Hiring an optimistic
manager has a similar effect to giving the manager an incentive to maximise a weighted sum of
profits and revenue, as discussed in Vickers (1985).
Assume that firm 1 has a profit maximising owner who is ambiguity neutral, i.e., has additive
beliefs. The owner hires a manager to operate the firm on his/her behalf. The owner pays him
a wage, which is fraction α of firm 1’s profit. The manager has CEU preferences and has beliefs
represented by a neo-additive capacity. The owner chooses the manager to maximise his/her
profit. Firm 2 is a conventional profit maximising firm. The following result finds the levels of
optimism, λ1 and pessimism, γ1, which are optimal for the owner of firm 1.
Proposition 4.3 The profit maximising levels of λ1 and γ1 satisfy
λ1 = 1− 3γ1 + 2γ1 (1 + c)(1− c) . (9)
Proof. Profit is maximised where the equilibrium output of firm 1 is equal to that of a
Stackelberg leader, which is 12 (1− c). Thus by Lemma A.1, (1−γ1+λ1)−(1+γ1+λ1)c3(1−γ1)+λ1 = 12 (1− c).
Cross multiplying we obtain, 2 (1− γ1 + λ1) − 2 (1 + γ1 + λ1) c = (1− c) (3 (1− γ1) + λ1), or
λ1 (2− 2c)−2γ1−2γ1c+2 (1− c) = 3 (1− γ1) (1− c)+λ1 (1− c). Hence λ1 (1− c) = 3 (1− γ1)
(1− c)− 2 (1− c) + 2γ1 (1 + c), from which the result follows. 
To understand this result it is useful to consider the special case where γ1 = 0. Then
equation (9) says λ1 = 1, which implies that the manager will assign weight one to the possibility
that the opponents will produce zero output and will himself produce the monopoly output.
This is desirable, since in this example, the monopoly output coincides with the output of a
Stackelberg leader, which is the most profitable output. Of course it is very unlikely that a
manager would assign the decision-weight one to the possibility that the opponent will produce
zero output. However it remains true that profit can be raised by delegating to a manager who
is more optimistic than the owner. From the point of view of the owner, there is an additional
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advantage of hiring an optimistic manager. The more optimistic the manager the lower the
value of α needed to induce the manager to work. This second effect also implies that it is
advantageous to hire an optimistic manager. Altogether those reasons suggest why we might
expect to see ambiguity-loving individuals in markets.
4.2 Bertrand Oligopoly
4.2.1 Equilibrium without Ambiguity
We shall now consider price (Bertrand) competition. Consider 2 firms producing heterogeneous
goods, which are close (but not perfect) substitutes. Firm i can produce at constant marginal
and average cost, k > 0. Firm i charges price pi for its output. We assume that firm i faces
a linear demand curve: Di(pi, p−i) = max{0, a + bp−i − cpi}, a, b, c > 0, a > k, c > b. The
following result describes the equilibrium when firms choose prices simultaneously.
Proposition 4.4 In Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand model,
1. the reaction function of firm i is given by
pi (p−i) =
a+ bp−i + ck
2c
, (10)
2. both firms charge a price equal to, pˆ = a+ck2c−b .
Proof. The profits of firm i are given by, ui = (pi − k) (a+ bp−i − cpi). The first order con-
dition for profit maximisation is: ∂ui∂pi = (a+ bp−i − cpi) − c (pi − k) = 0, from which part (1)
follows. Let pˆ denote the level of price charged by both firms in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
then pˆ = a+bpˆ+ck2c , which implies part (2). 
Now suppose that firm 1 is a price leader and must set price first. Firm 2 then observes the
price set by firm 1 and chooses its own price to maximise profit.
Proposition 4.5 If firm 1 is a price leader its optimal price is given by:
p1 =
2ac+ b (a+ ck)
2 (2c2 − b2) +
k
2
.
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The proof is contained in the appendix. With price leadership, firm 1 sets a price above
the Bertrand equilibrium level since it takes into account the fact that when it raises price, this
causes firm 2 to raise price as well. In this game there is a second mover advantage. Firm 2
makes higher profits since it can slightly undercut firm 1’s price.
4.2.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
Now assume that each firm perceives its rival’s behaviour as ambiguous and has beliefs repre-
sented by neo-additive capacities. Suppose that each firm perceives the worst case to be where
its rival reduces price to marginal cost. Hence we assume, a firm’s strategy set is the interval
[k,K] ⊆ R for some sufficiently high K. We shall assume the best case is perceived to be where
the rival firm sets price equal toK. Given this interpretation, it seems reasonable to require that
K be above the Nash equilibrium price, i.e., K > (a+ck)(2c−b) . We require a+ bk− cK > 0 to ensure
that demand is positive at all quantities in the firms’ strategy sets. With these assumptions
the (Choquet) expected profit of firm i becomes: Vi = (1− γi − λi) (pi − k) (a+ bp−i − cpi) +
γi (pi − k) (a+ bk − cpi) + λi (pi − k) (a+ bK − cpi). Simplifying Vi = (pi − k) (a− cpi)
+(pi − k) b [(1− γi − λi) p−i + γik + λiK]. The first-order condition for profit maximisation is:
∂Vi
∂pi
= a− cpi− c (pi − k)+ b [(1− γi − λi) p−i + γik + λiK] = 0. Thus firm i’s reaction function
is given by
ρi (p−i) =
a+ b [(1− γi − λi) p−i + γik + λiK] + ck
2c
. (11)
Equation (11) defines a non-singular system of linear equations, hence the Bertrand equi-
librium is unique. Since K > p−i > k, an increase in λi (resp. γi) will shift firm i’s reaction
curve up (resp. down) and hence increase (resp. decrease) the equilibrium price. The price of
firm −i will also increase, since reaction curves slope upwards. Consider firm 1. An increase in
optimism causes it to place more weight on good outcomes. In this context, a good outcome
would be firm 2 charging a high price. Since the model exhibits strategic complementarity, this
gives firm 1 an incentive to increase its price. This discussion is summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.6 In Bertrand oligopoly an increase in optimism (resp. pessimism) of firm i
causes both firms to set higher (resp. lower) prices in equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Bertrand equilibrium and uncertainty
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The case of two firms with symmetric linear demand functions is illustrated in figure 2. An
increase in pessimism causes the best-response function to shift down and the slope to decrease.
Firms have their own markets in which to react to the other’s price. Uncertainty about the
other price is equivalent to uncertainty about a firm’s own demand. The lower a given firm sets
the price, the smaller the market the opponents will face. Firms’ concern about low demand in
their respective market, provides an incentive for charging lower prices than in a conventional
(Bertrand) equilibrium. Hence, pessimism tends to increase the competitiveness of Bertrand
markets.
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4.2.3 Strategic Delegation
Equation (11) shows that an increase in λi will increase the equilibrium prices of both firms. In
Bertrand oligopoly, a given firm can gain a strategic advantage by committing to price above
the equilibrium level, see Fershtman and Judd (1987). This causes rivals to raise their prices,
which gives the first firm an indirect benefit since its profits are higher the greater the prices of
its rivals. Our results show that, appointing an optimistic manager would be a way to commit
to a price above the Nash equilibrium level. Hence an optimistic manager will make more profit
than an expected utility maximiser.
To illustrate the possibilities for strategic delegation we consider an specific form for the
demand function.
Example 2 Assume a = c = 2 and b = 1, i.e., D (pi, p−i) = 2 + p−i − 2pi, for i = 1, 2. By
Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, the Nash equilibrium price is, pˆ = 23 +
2
3k, while a price leader would
charge p˜1 = 10+9k14 . We assume that firm 2 is a conventional profit maximising firm. Consider
the case where firm 1 has ambiguity neutral owners, who delegate decision making to a man-
ager, whose beliefs are represented by a neo-additive capacity. In this case we can show that
γ1 = 0, λ1 = 10−5k56K−38−37k , are profit-maximising levels of λ1 and γ. This claim is proved in
Lemma A.2 in the appendix. 
The discussion of strategic delegation assumes that the ambiguity attitude of the manager
is observable. Managers do make public speeches and reports, which could be used to reveal
their ambiguity attitude. Many managers do appear to cultivate an optimistic view of their
firm’s performance. This could, in part, be motivated by strategic considerations.
In both Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly, profits can be increased above the Nash equilibrium
level by employing an optimistic manager. This is unusual as most comparative static results
are reversed when one moves from Cournot to Bertrand competition.
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5 Peace-making
Interactive decision making under ambiguity is not confined to economic contexts. We believe
that throughout social sciences there are many natural applications for our formal framework
of ambiguity. To illustrate this point, we next consider a model of peace-making. This model
also allows us to study the impact of ambiguity in a game with multiple equilibria.
5.1 A Peace-making Game
Consider two players i = 1, 2 interpreted as the parties involved in a conflict. Each player i
chooses a strategy si ∈ Si = [0, 1]. We interpret si = 0 as no effort, whereas si = 1 is full effort
to peace-making. Higher values of si correspond to greater peace-making efforts by individual
i. We assume that benefits from peace-making have the following form:
b (s1, s2) =
 ε (s1 + s2)
2 if s1 < 1 or s2 < 1, 0 < ε < 14 ,
1 if s1 = s2 = 1.
(12)
The benefits from peace making are increasing in the efforts of both parties, hence there are
positive externalities. An effort towards peace by one party brings benefits of peace to both. The
benefit function is convex, which implies there is strategic complementarity in peace-making.
The more effort is supplied by one party, the greater the marginal benefit of peace-making for
the other. The discontinuity at 〈1, 1〉 indicates that there is a qualitative difference between
peace and a war of very low intensity.
Peace-making can be costly. For example, decision makers may face threats from extremists
in their own camp not interested in peace. For simplicity we assume some linear costs csi, c > 0.
The payoff function u of either party i = 1, 2 is written
ui (si, sj) = b (si, sj)− csi. (13)
The game is given by GP = 〈(Si, ui)i=1,2〉. Peace is viewed as a public good produced with
increasing returns to scale. The following result characterises the Nash equilibria of the peace
game. This is the benchmark without ambiguity.
Proposition 5.1 Solutions without ambiguity of the peace-making game GP , are characterised
as follows:
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1. if ε > c, then full peace-making effort is the strictly dominant strategy for i = 1, 2;
2. if 1 − ε > c > ε then there exist two Nash equilibria in pure strategies one with full
peace-making effort and one where no effort is supplied by either party;11
3. if c > 1− ε, then no effort is the strictly dominant strategy for i = 1, 2.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Case (3) describes a situation where each side views the benefits of peace as being less than
the costs of peace-making, regardless of what the other party does. Consequently peace is not
established. Such a situation would arise if benefits from peace are small compared to costs of
peace-making efforts. This does not seem a realistic representation of situations such as in the
Middle East or Northern Ireland, where it seems most people perceive peace as worth achieving
if possible.
Case (1) is the non-problematic case. Benefits from peace are strictly larger than the costs.
Hence both parties provide full effort and peace is established. Again this does not appear to
be a reasonable model of the world’s conflict situations.
Case (2) is the interesting intermediate case. There are substantial benefits from peace
but benefits from intermediate peace-making efforts are not enough to justify the costs. This
seems to fit the circumstances in many potential conflict situations. Two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies arise, one in which both parties engage in full peace-making efforts establishing
peace and one in which no effort is made and peace is not achieved.
5.2 Peace-making under Ambiguity
Now we study the impact of ambiguity on the peace-making game. The following proposition
shows more optimism makes a successful peace process more likely. In the case where Nash
equilibrium is not unique, ambiguity can play a role in equilibrium selection. If the degree
of optimism is sufficiently high, there is a unique equilibrium in which the peace process suc-
ceeds. Pessimism has the opposite effect. If there is enough pessimism, then peace will not be
11There exists also a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where parties mix between zero and full peace-
making effort.
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established.
Proposition 5.2 The impact of ambiguity in the peace-making game, GP , is as follows:
1. if ε > c, then any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only the Nash equilibrium strategy
under certainty, i.e., si = 1, i = 1, 2;
2. if 1 − ε > c > ε, then any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only strategies si = 1 or
si = 0, i = 1, 2. Moreover, there exists λ¯ (resp. γ¯) such that if λ > λ¯ (resp. γ > γ¯) then
si = 1 (resp. si = 0) is the unique equilibrium strategy for i = 1, 2.
3. If c > 1 − ε, then any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only the Nash equilibrium
strategy under certainty, i.e., si = 0, i = 1, 2.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
We believe that case (2) is the relevant one when peace-making poses a serious political
problem. It is in this case, that ambiguity makes a difference. A high degree of pessimism
causes peace-making efforts to break down. On the other hand optimism (or more confidence
in the actions of the other side) can cause the peace-making process to be successful.
6 General Results
In this section we present some more general results for 2-player games with strategic com-
plements. We consider a game with 2-players, i = 1, 2, where the strategy sets are subsets of
the real line. In particular let Si = [si, s¯i] ⊆ R for i = 1, 2 and S = S1 × S2. Player i has a
concave utility function ui (s1, s2) and has beliefs on S−i represented by a neo-additive capacity
νi = λi + (1− λi − γi)pii. The following assumption is maintained throughout this section.
Assumption 6.1 (Strict Concavity) For all s1, s2 ∈ S, ui11 (s1, s2) < 0, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 6.1 (Uniqueness) Under Assumption 6.1, if the amount of ambiguity perceived
by player i, λi + γi is sufficiently large then the equilibrium under ambiguity is unique.
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The proof is contained in the appendix. This result may be explained as follows. If player
i believes player −i’s behaviour to be more ambiguous, player i’s behaviour becomes less re-
sponsive to changes in −i’s strategy. Thus the best-response function becomes flatter, which
results in a unique equilibrium.
Next we investigate the comparative statics of changing ambiguity attitudes. To get unam-
biguous comparative static results we assume strategic complementarity.
Assumption 6.2 (Strategic Complementarity) The game G has strategic complements, if
ui12 (s1, s2) > 0, for i = 1, 2.
12
Strategic complementarity says that if player −i increases his/her strategy this raises the mar-
ginal benefit to i of increasing his/her own strategy. If player i becomes more optimistic (s)he
will place higher weight on good outcomes. If there are positive (resp. negative) externalities
a good outcome will be interpreted as the opponent playing a high (resp. low) strategy. In
the presence of strategic complementarity this gives i an incentive to increase (resp. decrease)
his/her strategy. If equilibrium is unique, an increase in optimism will increase (resp. decrease)
equilibrium strategies of both players. If equilibrium is not unique we get a similar result. The
set of equilibria increases (resp. decreases), in the sense that the strategies played in the highest
and lowest equilibria increase (resp. decrease).
Proposition 6.2 (Comparative Statics) Under Assumptions 6.2 and positive (resp. nega-
tive) externalities the strategies of both players in the highest and lowest equilibria are increasing
(resp. decreasing) functions of λ1 and λ2 and decreasing (resp. increasing) functions of γ1 and
γ2).
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Corollary 6.1 (Equilibrium Selection) Under Assumptions 6.2 and positive (resp. nega-
tive) externalities, if λi is sufficiently large, then equilibrium is unique and is larger (resp.
smaller) than the largest (resp. smallest) equilibrium without ambiguity. If γi is sufficiently
large, then equilibrium is unique and is smaller (resp. larger) than the smallest (resp. largest)
equilibrium without ambiguity.
12As usual ui12 denotes
∂2ui
∂s1∂s2
.
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Proof. Follows from Propositions 6.1 and 6.2. 
Thus ambiguity can act as an equilibrium selection device. Under positive (resp. negative)
externalities, if agents are sufficiently optimistic, all will focus on an equilibrium in which high
(resp. low) strategies are played. The assumption of positive (resp. negative) externalities
and strategic complementarity implies that the highest (resp. smallest) equilibrium is Pareto
superior. In this case, optimism would select the equilibrium with the highest level of economic
activity. As usual, pessimism has the opposite effect.
Without further assumptions, Proposition 6.2 can not directly be extended to games with
strategic substitutes, i.e., games for which ui12 (s1, s2) < 0, even in the case of two players
only. Although one can show that for negative (positive) externalities, best-response strategies
increase (decrease) in the degree of optimism (and opposite for the degree of pessimism), the
change of equilibrium depends on the relative shift of those best-responses correspondences.
7 Concluding Discussion
We introduce a simple model of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it can be applied to
many situations of interest in economics and social sciences. New results are derived for both,
optimistic as well as pessimistic attitudes towards ambiguity. It is possible to generalise these
applications in many ways. The applications here were chosen to represent cases of strategic
substitutes (Cournot equilibrium), strategic complements with a unique equilibrium (Bertrand
equilibrium) and strategic complements with multiple equilibria (peace-making).
The assumptions imposed can be relaxed using lattice theoretical methods, see Topkis
(1998). For instance, if the strategy space is a complete lattice, then existence results and
results on the monotone comparative statics of equilibrium under ambiguity with respect to
ambiguity attitudes can be derived if payoff functions are supermodular and have increasing
differences. Extensions to more than two players are possible but introduce technical compli-
cations concerning the product capacity, see Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Eichberger and
Kelsey (2002).
Lo (1996) and Marinacci (2000) present alternative equilibrium definitions based on different
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notions of support. In Lo’s definition of equilibrium players do not perceive ambiguity about
whether their opponents play best responses. This results in behavior which does not differ
substantially from Nash equilibrium. There have been a number of definitions of support
proposed for convex capacities. See Ryan (1997) for a full discussion. If λ = 0 the neo-additive
capacity is convex. Our definition of support coincides with most of the proposed definitions
in this case.
Our model of ambiguity allows for a meaningful notion of optimism and pessimism. Wakker
(2001) provides precise definitions of optimism and pessimism in CEU models. Epstein (1999)
and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide alternative concepts of ambiguity aversion. In
the case of CEU, Ghirardato and Marinacci take additive capacities as the benchmark case of
no ambiguity-aversion, while Epstein argues for capacities which are monotone transformations
of an additive probability (probabilistic sophistication) as the relevant benchmark. This im-
plies that a convex and increasing transformation of an additive probability is interpreted as
ambiguity-aversion by Ghirardato and Marinacci and as probabilistic risk-aversion by Epstein.
We cannot resolve this controversy here. However, we mainly consider pure equilibria of games,
in which case the two definitions agree.
Some related results can be found in Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). The present paper ex-
tends those results since they apply to optimistic as well as pessimistic attitudes to ambiguity.
In addition the present paper has continuous rather than discrete strategy spaces. Eichberger
and Kelsey (2002) confined attention to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games, assump-
tions not used in our paper. Moreover, Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) established uniqueness of
equilibrium with a high degree of ambiguity when a restrictive assumption was satisfied (As-
sumption 3.2 of Eichberger and Kelsey (2002)). The results in Eichberger and Kelsey (2002)
are proved for general pessimistic CEU preferences. This demonstrates that the restriction to
neo-additive capacities is not crucial for our results but simplify greatly the technical exposition.
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) provide also some further applications. For example, in a model
of voluntary contributions to public goods it is shown that ambiguity increases the provision
of public goods. This potentially explains why donations often appear to be well above Nash
equilibrium levels.
The applications, presented in this paper, can only serve to illustrate the type of results
28
which one can expect to obtain by including ambiguity in economic analysis. Our intuition
suggests that the conclusions obtained are not unreasonable. So far, there exists experimental
evidence only for the impact of ambiguity aversion on individual decision making, Kilka and
Weber (1998).
We believe that our approach is simple and intuitive in order to be applicable to various
problems in economics and social sciences by a wide audience. This paper suggests also a number
of directions for future research. One, which we are actively pursuing is experimental testing
of the impact of ambiguity in games. The theory in the present paper provides some testable
hypotheses. For instance, for given externalities, ambiguity has the opposite effect in games
of strategic complements and substitutes. This result should, in principle, be experimentally
testable.
A Appendix
A.1 Oligopoly
Lemma A.1 Assume that the manager of firm 2 is ambiguity neutral (i.e., γ2 = λ2 = 0),
while the manager of firm 1 is not necessarily ambiguity neutral. Then under Cournot quantity
competition the equilibrium output of firm 1 is given by:
x¯1 =
(1− γ1 + λ1)− (1 + γ1 + λ1) c
3 (1− γ1) + λ1 .
Proof. From equation (7), firm 1’s reaction function is given by, R1 (x2) =
(1−γ1)−(1−γ1−λ1)x2−c
2(1−γ1) .
By similar reasoning firm 2’s reaction function is, R2 (x1) = 1−c−x12 . Solving for equilibrium
in the usual way we obtain: x1 =
2(1−γ1)−(1−γ1−λ1)(1−c−x1)−2c
4(1−γ1) . Thus
[
4(1−γ1)−(1−γ1−λ1)
4(1−γ1)
]
x1 =
(1−γ1+λ1)−(1+γ1+λ1)c
4(1−γ1) from which the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5 By equation (10), firm 2’s reaction function is given by p2 =
a+bp1+ck
2c . Firm 1’s profits are given by, u1 = (p1 − k)
(
a+ ba+bp1+ck2c − cp1
)
. The first order
condition for profit maximisation is: ∂u1∂p1 = a + b
a+ck
2c +
(
b2−2c2
2c
)
p1 + (p1 − k)
(
b2−2c2
2c
)
= 0.
Solving for p1 we find, 2
(
2c2−b2
2c
)
p1 = k
(
2c2−b2
2c
)
+ a+ ba+ck2c , from which the result follows. 
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Lemma A.2 Provided K > 10+9k14 , in Example 2 the optimal value of λ1 is
λ1 =
10− 5k
56K − 38− 37k > 0. (14)
Proof. By equation (11), firm 2’s reaction function is given by p2 = 2+p1+2k4 . Firm 1’s reaction
function is given by p1 =
2+2k+λ1K+(1−λ)p2
4 . Solving for equilibrium, p1 =
8+8k+4λ1K+(1−λ)(2+2k)
16 +
(1− λ) p116 . Hence
[
16−(1−λ1)
16
]
p1 =
8+8k+4λ1K+(1−λ1)(2+2k)
16 or p1 =
8+8k+4λ1K+(1−λ1)(2+2k)
16−(1−λ1) .
Profit is maximised where this is equal to the price which would be chosen by a price leader
without ambiguity. Hence 8+8k+4λ1K+(1−λ1)(2+2k)16−(1−λ1) =
10+9k
14 . Solving for λ1, 112+112k+56λ1K+
28 (1− λ1) (1 + k) = 160−10 (1− λ1)+144k−9k (1− λ1), which implies 56λ1K−38λ1−37λ1k =
10− 5k, from which equation (14) follows.
Note that 56K − 38 − 37k > 56 (10+9k14 ) − 38 − 37k = 40 + 36k − 37k = 2 − k > 0, since
2 = a > k. (Recall 10+9k14 is the output a price leader would choose.) 
A.2 Peace-making
Proof of Proposition 5.1 Since b is convex, any party’s best response is either si = 0 or
si = 1.
Case (1) If s2 6= 1, u(1, s2)− u(s1, s2) = ε (1 + s2)2 − c−
[
ε (s1 + s2)
2 − cs1
]
= ε
(
1− s21 + 2s2 − 2s1s2
)− c (1− s1) = ε ((1 + s1) (1− s1) + 2s2 (1− s1))− c (1− s1)
= (1− s1) [ε (1 + s1 + 2s2)− c] > 0, since, by assumption, ε > c.
The case s2 = 1 can be covered as follows: u(1, 1)− u(s1, 1) = 1− c−
[
ε (s1 + 1)
2 − cs1
]
=
(1− 4ε) + 4ε− ε (s21 + 2s1 + 1)− c (1− s1) = (1− 4ε) + 2ε (1− s1) + ε (1− s21)− c (1− s1) =
(1− 4ε) + (1− s1) [2ε+ ε (s1 + 1)− c] > 0 since ε > c.
Case (2) To show that s1 = s2 = 1 is a Nash equilibrium, by convexity of b it is enough
to show u(1, 1) > u(0, 1). This holds since, u(1, 1) − u(0, 1) = 1 − ε − c > 0. Now u(0, 0) = 0,
u(1, 0) = ε− c 6 0, by assumption, which implies that s1 = s2 = 0 is also a Nash equilibrium.
Case (3) If s1 6= 1, u(0, s2) − u(s1, s2) = εs22 − ε (s1 + s2)2 + cs1 = cs1 − ε
(
2s1s2 + s21
)
>
c−3ε > 0, since c > 1−ε implies c > 34 > 3ε. The remaining case follows since u(1, 1)−u(0, 1) =
1− ε− c < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2 Cases (1) and (3) are proved by Proposition 5.1 and the
30
observation that CEU preferences respect strict dominance.
Case (2) By convexity the only best responses can be 0 or 1. Without loss of generality
consider player 1. Assume that his/her beliefs are represented by a neo-additive-capacity ν =
λ + (1− γ − λ)pi. Let V (1)(resp. V (0)) denote his/her (Choquet) expected utility if (s)he
chooses 1 (resp. 0). Then, V (1) = λ (1− c) + γ (ε− c) + (1− γ − λ)
[
εEpi (1 + s2)
2 − c
]
,
V (0) = λε + (1− γ − λ) εEpis22, where Epi denotes expectation with respect to the additive
probability pi. Now V (1)−V (0) = λ (1− c)+γ (ε− c)+(1− γ − λ)
[
εEpi (1 + s2)
2 − c
]
−λε−
(1− γ − λ) εEpis22 = λ (1− ε− c) + γ (ε− c) + (1− γ − λ) [εEpi (1 + 2s2)− c]. By assumption
1 − ε − c > 0 and ε − c < 0, hence if λ (resp. γ) is sufficiently large V (1) > V (0) (resp.
V (1) < V (0)), from which the result follows. 
A.3 General Results
Lemma A.3 Under Assumption 6.1 the slope of the best-response functions is given by
R1′ (s2) =
− (1− λ1 − γ1)u112
(
R1 (s2) , s2
)
λ1M111 (R1 (s2)) + γ1m
1
11 (R1 (s2)) + (1− λ1 − γ1)u111 (R1 (s2) , s2)
R2′ (s1) =
− (1− λ2 − γ2)u212
(
s1, R
2 (s1)
)
λ2M222 (R2 (s1)) + γ2m
2
22 (R2 (s1)) + (1− λ2 − γ2)u222 (s1, R2 (s1))
.
Proof. Let Ri denote the best-response function of player i. Consider player 1, his/her
Choquet expected utility is given by: λ1M1 (s1) + γ1m1 (s1) + (1− λ1 − γ1)u1 (s1, s2). By
Assumption 6.1 his/her best-response function is defined by,
λ1M
1
1
(
R1 (s2)
)
+ γ1m11
(
R1 (s2)
)
+ (1− λ1 − γ1)u11
(
R1 (s2) , s2
)
= 0. (15)
Differentiating (15) with respect to s2 we obtain, λ1M111
(
R1 (s2)
)
R1′ (s2)
+ γ1m111
(
R1 (s2)
)
R1′ (s2) + (1− λ1 − γ1)u111
(
R1 (s2) , s2
)
R1′ (s2)
+ (1− λ1 − γ1)u112
(
R1 (s2) , s2
)
= 0. From which the result follows. The slope of R2 can be
derived by analogous reasoning. 
Proof of Proposition 6.1 Consider the function, g : S1 × S2 → S1 × S2, defined by
g (s1, s2) =
〈
R1 (s2)− s1, R2 (s1)− s2
〉
. The partial derivatives of g are ∂g
1
∂s1
= −1, ∂g1∂s2 =
R1′ (s2) , ∂g
2
∂s1
= R2′ (s1) and ∂g
2
∂s2
= −1. Let J denote the Jacobian matrix of g. Then J = −1 R1′ (s2)
R2′ (s1) −1
. The trace of J is −2. Thus if the determinant of J is positive, both
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eigenvalues must be negative and hence J is negative definite. The determinant of J is
1−R1′ (s2)R2′ (s1) > 1− (1−λ2−γ2)(1−λ1−γ1)Q
2
δ2
, since
R1′ (s2) =
−(1−λ1−γ1)u112(R1(s2),s2)
λ1M111(R
1(s2))+γ1m111(R
1(s2))+(1−λ1−γ1)u111(R1(s2),s2)
,
∣∣R1′ (s2)∣∣ 6 (1−λ1−γ1)Qδ , where Q =
max〈s1,s2〉∈S
∣∣u112 (s1, s2)∣∣ and δ = min〈s1,s2〉∈S ∣∣u111 (s1, s2)∣∣. Since the strategy space is compact
this minimum exists. It follows that J is negative definite if λ1 + γ1 is sufficiently large. By
Theorem 4.3 of Eichberger (1993), negative definiteness of J implies that equilibrium is unique.

The next result characterises the highest and lowest equilibria in terms of the slope of the
best-response functions.
Lemma A.4 If the highest and lowest equilibria are interior equilibria, then R1′ (s2)R2′ (s1) 6
1 at these equilibria.
Proof. Define ρ : [s1, s¯1] → [s1, s¯1] by ρ (s1) = R1
(
R2 (s1)
)
. By assumption there are no
corner equilibria, hence ρ (s1) > s1 and ρ (s¯1) < s¯1. Let 〈sˆ1, sˆ2〉 be an equilibrium such that
R1′ (s2)R2′ (s1) > 1. Then for all sufficiently small δ > 0, ρ (sˆ1 + δ) > sˆ1 + δ. Let φ (s1) =
ρ (s1)−s1. Then φ (sˆ1 + δ) > 0 and φ (s¯1) < 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists
s′ ∈ (sˆ1 + δ, s¯1) such that φ (s′1) = s′1. Therefore 〈sˆ1, sˆ2〉 is not the highest equilibrium. An
analogous argument applies to the lowest equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 6.2 Let 〈sˆ1, sˆ2〉 denote the highest equilibrium. Assume first that
〈sˆ1, sˆ2〉 is an interior equilibrium. Since 〈sˆ1, sˆ2〉 is an interior equilibrium it satisfies the first
order conditions for best responses.
λ1M
1
1 (s1) + γ1m
1
1 (s1) + (1− λ1 − γ1)u11 (s1, s2) = 0, (16)
λ2M
2
2 (s2) + γ2m
2
2 (s2) + (1− λ2 − γ2)u22 (s1, s2) = 0. (17)
Differentiating (17) with respect to λ1 we obtain:[
λ2M
2
22 (s2) + γ2m
2
22 (s2) + (1− λ2 − γ2)u222 (s1, s2)
]
∂s2
∂λ1
+(1− λ2 − γ2)u212 (s1, s2) ∂s1∂λ1 = 0.Hence
∂s2
∂λ1
= R2′ (s1)
∂s1
∂λ1
. (18)
Differentiating (16) with respect to λ1 we obtain,[
λ1M
1
11 (s1) + γ1m
1
11 (s1) + (1− λ1 − γ1)u111 (s1, s2)
]
∂s1
∂λ1
+ (1− λ1 − γ1)u112 (s1, s2) ∂s2∂λ1
= u11 (s1, s2)−M11 (s1).
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Hence ∂s1∂λ1 +
(1−λ1−γ1)u112(s1,s2)
λ1M111(s1)+γ1m
1
11(s1)+(1−λ1−γ1)u111(s1,s2)
∂s2
∂λ1
= u
1
1(s1,s2)−M11 (s1)
λ1M111(s1)+γ1m
1
11(s1)+(1−λ1−γ1)u111(s1,s2)
.
Substituting from (18), ∂s1∂λ1−R1′ (s2)R2′ (s1) ∂s1∂λ1 =
u11(s1,s2)−M11 (s1)
λ1M111(s1)+γ1m
1
11(s1)+(1−λ1−γ1)u111(s1,s2)
. Hence
∂s1
∂λ1
= u
1
1(s1,s2)−M11 (s1)
λ1M111(s1)+γ1m
1
11(s1)+(1−λ1−γ1)u111(s1,s2)
[
1−R1′ (s2)R2′ (s1)
]−1. If the game has positive
(resp. negative) externalities, then u11(s1, s2) − M11 (s1) = u11(s1, s2) − u11(s1, s¯2) (resp. =
u11(s1, s2) − u11(s1, s2)). By Assumption 6.2, if the game has positive (resp. negative) ex-
ternalities then u11(s1, s2)−M11 (s1) < 1 (resp. > 1). By Lemma A.4, 1− R1′ (s2)R2′ (s1) > 0.
Hence, if the game has positive (resp. negative) externalities then ∂s1∂λ1 > 0 (resp. 6 0), and by
equation (18) ∂s2∂λ1 > 0 (resp. 6 0). The results for the effect of changing the other parameters
on the highest and lowest equilibria can be obtained by analogous reasoning.
Now consider the case where the highest equilibrium is on the boundary of the strategy
set and the game has positive externalities. In particular suppose that when λ1 = λ˜1 that the
highest equilibrium is 〈s¯1, s¯2〉. Firstly it is trivially true that a decrease in λ1 must (weakly)
decrease the equilibrium strategies of both players. Now suppose λ1 increases from λ˜1 to λˆ1.
The equilibrium at 〈s¯1, s¯2〉 satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
λ˜1M
1
1 (s¯1) + γ1m
1
1 (s¯1) + (1− λ˜1 − γ1)u11 (s¯1, s¯2) > 0, (19)
λ2M
2
1 (s¯2) + γ2m
2
1 (s¯2) + (1− λ2 − γ2)u21 (s¯1, s¯2) > 0. (20)
Since λˆ1M11 (s¯1) + γ1m
1
1 (s¯1) + (1− λˆ1 − γ1)u11 (s¯1, s¯2) = λ˜1M11 (s¯1) + γ1m11 (s¯1) +
(1 − λ˜1 − γ1)u11 (s¯1, s¯2), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are still satisfied when λ1 = λˆ1. By
concavity, these conditions are sufficient hence 〈s¯1, s¯2〉 remains the highest equilibrium when
λ1 = λˆ1. Analogous reasoning applies to the lowest equilibrium, other parameter changes and
negative externalities. 
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